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INTRODUCTION 
Members of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure have 
long worked to address complaints that discovery is too costly, and that cases 
take too long to resolve.1 Four decades of rulemaking action have targeted 
these issues and have resulted in the amendment of the civil procedure rules, 
particularly the discovery rules, more often than any other body of procedural 
law.2 Still, complaints continue to be mounted.3 The Committee’s recent pro-
posed changes to the discovery rules are the latest attempt to address the per-
ceived problem of cost and delay.4 The proposals have been controversial. Over 
two thousand comments were submitted to the Committee, and some comments 
divided along the lines of plaintiffs’ lawyers disfavoring the proposed rules and 
defense lawyers favoring them.5 Given the considerable debate over the pro-
posed amendments, the question becomes under what circumstances should ad-
visory committees propose and adopt rule amendments. 
                                                        
*  Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks to the organizers and participants 
of the Northeastern University School of Law Symposium honoring Professor Steve Subrin. 
Thanks also for comments from Brooke Coleman, Emory Lee, and Jeff Stempel. Special 
thanks to Dawson Price for his work on this article, researching and writing the first drafts. 
**  J.D., 2014, University of Illinois College of Law. 
1  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE], availa-
ble at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/reporttothechiefjusticepdf/. 
2  Id. (“the Civil Rules, particularly the discovery rules, have been amended more frequently 
than any others.”); see Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice 
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1103 (2012). 
3  See REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1. 
4  Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 4 (May 8, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/14696/ [hereinafter 
May 2013 Advisory Committee Report]. 
5  Tony Mauro, Lawyers Spar over Discovery Rules: Litigation Costs at Center of Debate, 
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 24, 2014, at 1; Rebecca L. Shult, 2,000+ Public Comments Submitted  
Responding to Proposed Changes to FRCP, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 21, 2014), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dd0982a2-7c5a-4001-8380-648939119c8a. 
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Commentators have criticized the rulemaking process for decades. Legal 
scholarship in the area has focused primarily on challenging its constitutionali-
ty,6 questioning whether different actors may make better rulemakers,7 and ar-
guing that some entities have too much power and others have too little.8 Other 
commentators have focused on the tools that should be employed by rulemak-
ers when evaluating proposals, focusing on the importance of empirical studies 
to support rule changes9 and the role of bias in the formulation of certain 
rules.10 
In this symposium article, we add to this scholarship by arguing that advi-
sory committees should refrain from proposing and adopting rule amendments 
that are motivated by atypical cases. Such rules will also affect typical cases, 
creating bad law for typical cases because the rules were not formulated for 
such cases. 
Part I discusses the committee rulemaking procedure, previous attempts to 
modify the scope of discovery with particular emphasis on the 2000 discovery 
amendments, and creation of the current proposals. Part II describes the thesis 
of a previous article on how atypical cases make bad law11 and applies the 
framework to one of the current amendments, showing that atypical cases make 
bad rules. Part III offers our brief recommendations on how rulemakers can 
avoid atypical rule amendments. 
                                                        
6  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling 
Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 1303 (2006). But see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: 
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 
(1999) (defending court-based rulemaking as central to developing and maintaining rules 
that reflect principled deliberation). 
7  See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal 
Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 293–96 (2009); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, 
Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation 
Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 754–59 (1993). But see Bone, supra note 6 (arguing for a 
“centralized, court-based, and committee-centered” system); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rule-
making Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975) 
(arguing that the “legislative process seems particularly unsuited” to rulemaking). 
8  See, e.g., Friedenthal, supra note 7; Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal 
Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993); Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal 
Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1976). 
9  See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Dis-
covery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 
(1994); Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 
39 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998) [hereinafter Mullenix, The Sequel]; Reda, supra note 2; Will 
Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case Coding 
Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60 (2013). 
10  See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors 
of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529 (2001). 
11  See Suja A. Thomas, How Atypical, Hard Cases Make Bad Law (See, e.g., The Lack of 
Judicial Restraint in Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Ricci), 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 989 (2013). 
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I. DISCOVERY RULEMAKING 
A. An Overview of the Committee Rulemaking Process 
The authority for the present committee rulemaking procedure stems from 
the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”) which authorizes the Supreme Court to “pre-
scribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases” 
in district and appellate level federal courts.12 Congress delegated the bulk of 
the rulemaking process between three lower entities: The Judicial Conference 
of the United States (the “Conference”), the Standing Committee, and Advisory 
Committees.13 The Conference is tasked with oversight of the rulemaking pro-
cess and must “prescribe and publish the procedures for the consideration of 
proposed rules” under the REA.14 To facilitate this task, the Conference may 
appoint advisory committees consisting of “members of the bench and the pro-
fessional bar, and trial and appellate judges”15 to recommend rules to be pre-
scribed.16 Additionally, the Conference must appoint a “standing committee on 
rules of practice, procedure, and evidence”17 to oversee the coordination and 
suggestions of the various advisory committees. 
The steps in the rulemaking process involve largely linear interactions be-
tween these three entities, the Supreme Court, and Congress in a hierarchical 
structure.18 It is a time-consuming procedure requiring several years to com-
plete.19 It begins when a rule suggestion by a judge, lawyer, professor, or other 
individual or body is considered by the relevant advisory committee.20 If the 
advisory committee is in favor of the change, it must draft and submit a pro-
posed amendment, including an explanatory note and a written report explain-
                                                        
12  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). See generally Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government 
Work: The Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69 (2010) (providing an overview 
of the rulemaking process); Procedures Governing the Rulemaking Process, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/laws-procedures-gov 
erning-work-rules/rules-committee-procedures.aspx (revised Sept. 2011) (summarizing the 
rulemaking process). 
13  28 U.S.C. § 2073. 
14  Id. § 2073(a)(1). 
15  Id. § 2073(a)(2). 
16  Id. There are currently five advisory committees, each focusing on a specific procedural 
area: appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and evidence rules. John D. Bates, Overview for 
the Bench, Bar, and Public, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAnd 
Policies/rules/about-rulemaking/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-
public.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). 
17  28 U.S.C. § 2073(b). 
18  Id. §§ 2073–2075. 
19  The time to complete the rulemaking process may vary based on the nature of the pro-
posed rule, the advisory committee involved, and the strength and number of affected indi-
viduals and groups. Commentator estimates of the usual length of time required to complete 
the rulemaking process have ranged from two to five years. Bates, supra note 16 (“it usually 
takes two to three years for a suggestion to be enacted as a rule”); Rhee, supra note 9, at 145 
(estimating the usual rulemaking process to take between three and five years). 
20  Bates, supra note 16. 
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ing its action, to the standing committee.21 Upon approval, the proposed rule is 
published for a period of public comment, normally six months.22 After the 
public comments are collected and considered, the advisory committee may re-
submit the proposal for public comment if significant changes are made to the 
proposal, or submit a final form of the proposed rule to the Standing Committee 
for approval.23 If the Standing Committee approves the proposed rule, the Con-
ference considers it and may recommend it to the Supreme Court.24 Upon Su-
preme Court approval, it must be sent to Congress by May 1 in order to take 
effect that year.25 Upon Congress’s approval or inaction, the rule is enacted in 
December.26 
At each step of the process, higher level entities may reject, modify, or re-
commit the proposal to a lower level entity for additional consideration.27 In 
practice, these actions occur less frequently as proposals move to higher entities 
in the rulemaking hierarchy, with revisionary action most likely to occur as 
proposals move between the standing and advisory committees.28 Also Con-
gressional rejection or modification of a proposed rule has occurred only on ra-
re occasions since the inception of the modern rulemaking procedure.29 
Commentators have concluded that lower level advisory committees “often 
dictate the outcome of the [rulemaking] process”30 and enjoy “near absolute 
discretion.”31 Because the advisory committee members are the most active and 
perhaps most influential in the rulemaking process, this paper focuses on the 
actions of the advisory committee. 
B. Early Attempts to Reform the Scope of Discovery 
Discovery reform efforts began in earnest at Chief Justice Burger’s 1976 
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Admin-
istration of Justice (the “Pound Conference”).32 Given the liberal understanding 
of the discovery rules at the time, the Advisory Committee was hesitant to dra-
matically narrow the scope of discovery despite considerable pressure from the 
                                                        
21  28 U.S.C. § 2073(d). 
22  Bates, supra note 16. 
23  Id. 
24  28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074. 
25  Id. § 2074(a). 
26  Id. 
27  Stancil, supra note 12, at 78. 
28  See id.; Walker, supra note 8, at 468 (“The Standing Committee has modified Advisory 
Committee action on only a handful of occasions, and the Judicial Conference itself has tak-
en even less action.” (footnote omitted)); see also Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 676 (criticiz-
ing the passive nature of the Supreme Court in rulemaking activity). 
29  See Stancil, supra note 12, at 78. 
30  Id., at 72–73. 
31  Walker, supra note 8, at 463. 
32  Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 765–66 (2010); Stempel, supra note 10, at 543. 
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Chief Justice.33 One of the most influential proposals to narrow Rule 26 in the 
wake of the Pound Conference was a 1977 report by the American Bar Associ-
ation (“ABA”) Section on Litigation recommending the then-existing “relevant 
to the subject matter” discovery standard of Rule 26(b)(1) be narrowed to a 
“relevant to the claims and defenses of the parties” standard.34 This proposal 
was supported by the American College of Trial Lawyers (“ACTL”).35 The 
Advisory Committee initially adopted the recommendations of the ABA and 
published the proposal for public comment but ultimately withdrew the pro-
posal in light of significant opposition.36 
Over the next twenty years, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were adopted in 1983 and 1993 to reduce cost and delay, but the Advi-
sory Committee continued to reject the ABA’s 1977 recommendation.37 In 
1996 the Advisory Committee again began to investigate whether the scope of 
discovery should be narrowed.38 The Committee appointed a discovery sub-
committee to determine, among other things, the cost of discovery generally 
and in the most expensive cases, and whether those costs were excessive 
enough to warrant changes.39 The subcommittee solicited help from the Federal 
Judicial Center (“FJC”) and RAND Corporation to investigate the discovery 
process in federal litigation and held two conferences in 1997 to solicit judicial, 
practitioner, and academic opinion on the discovery process.40 
In its initial report to the Advisory Committee that summarized the find-
ings of one of the conferences, the subcommittee noted that discovery was 
working well in most cases.41 In discussing potential “core” discovery rule 
amendments, the Advisory Committee noted: 
The reality of discovery practice is not what might seem from talking with law-
yers who pursue high-stakes and complex litigation in the major metropolitan 
centers. The reality is the small and medium case. In these cases, every study 
and much experience suggests that discovery is working well. And it seems like-
                                                        
33  Stempel, supra note 10, at 543–44. 
34  Id., at 544. 
35  Id. at 557–58. 
36  Id. at 544. 
37  Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 49, 54 (2007); Stempel, supra note 10, at 544–49. 
38  Amelia F. Burroughs, Comment, Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 84 (2001). 
39  Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee (Oct. 6–7, 1997), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/17737/ [hereinafter Advisory Committee Minutes (October 
1997)]. 
40  Stempel, supra note 10, at 555. 
41  Advisory Committee Minutes (October 1997), supra note 39; Minutes, Civil Rules Advi-
sory Committee (Nov. 12–13, 1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15145/ [here-
inafter Advisory Committee Minutes (November 1998)] (“The FJC data proved very inter-
esting. The data, in line with earlier studies, show that discovery is not used at all in a 
substantial fraction of federal civil actions, and that in more than 80% of federal civil actions 
discovery is not perceived to be a problem.”). 
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ly that there is nothing the formal rules can do about the cases that now present 
problems. The rules provide ample power to control discovery; what is needed is 
actual use of the power.42 
In light of this information, the Committee expressed interest in exploring 
solutions to address problem cases without affecting the well-functioning typi-
cal cases.43 Despite sentiment toward a narrow reform approach at this initial 
meeting, the Committee ultimately proposed a broad rule, which would affect 
all cases, adopting the 1977 scope amendment that the ABA had proposed, 
again also supported by the ACTL.44 In describing the proposal, the Committee 
noted that the full range of discovery would be available in all cases upon court 
determination or party agreement, but the Committee was careful to explain 
that the proposal “makes it clear that there is a reduction in the scope of discov-
ery available as a matter of right.”45 Despite considerable criticism, the pro-
posal was approved in 2000.46 
Disapproval of the new rule continued after its adoption. Scholars noted 
that the rule was not supported by empirical evidence,47 that it was designed by 
the legal elite, particularly corporate defense interests,48 that the rule would 
generate greater uncertainty for practicing attorneys and judges,49 and that the 
rule would result in a dramatic increase in purely procedural motion challenges 
and posturing,50 or be completely ignored by the courts.51 In the years since its 
passage, many have been dissatisfied with its effectiveness, including some 
who were initially supportive of the change. Critics have noted that judges and 
attorneys largely have ignored the rule, rendering it “toothless.”52 
                                                        
42  Advisory Committee Minutes (October 1997), supra note 39, at 8. 
43  Id. (“[T]here is no intention to affect discovery as it is practiced in most cases. All of the 
proposed limits on lawyer-managed discovery would permit discovery without judicial in-
volvement at levels that include the vast majority of cases under actual present practice.”). 
44  Stempel, supra note 10, at 556–59; Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L. 
REV. 1433, 1440 (1999) (“[T]he proposed measure would apply to all lawsuits, even though 
the recent FJC and RAND studies indicate that overbroad discovery principally occurs in a 
rather small number of complicated cases.”). 
45  Advisory Committee Minutes (November 1998), supra note 41. 
46  Stempel, supra note 10, at 530–31. 
47  See, e.g., Mullenix, The Sequel, supra note 9. 
48  See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 10. 
49  See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 44. 
50  See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in A Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on 
the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 14 (2001). 
51  See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 37, at 61. 
52  Id. at 63; see also Ronald J. Hedges, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical 
Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 
F.R.D. 123, 126 (2005); John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective 
Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 578 (2010) (describing a lack of clarity regarding 
the pre- and post-amendment discovery standards); Christopher C. Frost, The Sound and the 
Fury or the Sound of Silence?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1039, 1062 (2003) (describing an “ingrained 
mindset of liberal discovery” among the bar and bench). 
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C. Proposed Change to Discovery Rule 26(b)(1) 
In light of continued criticism of discovery practice, calls to narrow the 
scope of discovery persisted.53 An April 2008 study regarding discovery that 
surveyed members of the ACTL especially caught the attention of rulemakers. 
The ACTL and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal Sys-
tem (“IAALS”), which jointly conducted the study, concluded that “the system 
is not working; it takes too long and costs too much. . . . Discovery costs far too 
much and has become an end in itself.”54 In response to these concerns, the 
Standing Committee asked the Advisory Committee to hold a conference on 
the issues of cost and delay in the federal system.55 The Advisory Committee 
began the process of soliciting information about discovery costs from interest-
ed parties and requested a study from the FJC to focus on the costs of discovery 
generally and electronic discovery specifically under the rules.56 The 2010 
Conference on Civil Litigation (the “Duke Conference”) resulted from those 
planning efforts. 
Impressionistic57 survey data presented at the Duke Conference reflected 
the general sentiment that litigation was too costly and took too long. A Na-
tional Employment Lawyers Association  survey of member attorneys, an 
IAALS survey of corporate general counsel, a survey given to members of the 
ABA Section of Litigation, and the final version of the ACTL-IAALS survey 
all found that respondent attorneys believed that the discovery process was too 
costly, took too long, and was unfair.58 A survey of Fortune 200 companies 
                                                        
53  Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 767 (“After further rule amendments in 2000 and 2006, 
the complaints are louder than ever.”). 
54  AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK 
FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 3 (2008) [hereinafter ACTL & IAALS, INTERIM REPORT], available at 
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID= 
3650. 
55  John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE L.J. 537, 537 (2010). 
56  EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT TO 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 5 (2009) [hereinafter FJC 
REPORT], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file 
/dissurv1.pdf; Reda, supra note 2 at 1091 n.17. 
57  Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 775; Reda, supra note 2, at 1100 (“The bulk of what 
the Duke Conference labeled ‘empirical data’ consisted of opinion surveys that reflected the 
concerns and beliefs among legal professionals.” (footnote omitted)). 
58  REBECCA M. HAMBURG & MATTHEW C. KOSKI, NAT’L EMP’T LAWYERS ASS’N, SUMMARY 
OF RESULTS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF NELA MEMBERS, FALL 2009,  
at 11 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/natl-employment-law 
yers-assoc-survey-nela-members-2009 (“Nearly 65% of NELA respondents find that exist-
ing discovery mechanisms do not work well, and approximately two-thirds believe that dis-
covery is abused in almost every case.”); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., CIVIL LITIGATION SURVEY OF CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
BELONGING TO THE ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 17 (2010), available  
at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/institute-advancement-amer-legal-system-civ 
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conducted by the Lawyers for Civil Justice (“LCJ”) also found that outside le-
gal fees and costs had increased from an average of $66 million to $140 million 
between 2000 and 2008 for the respondent companies.59 Several reports since 
the Duke Conference further supported the general sentiment among attorneys 
that litigation and discovery in particular were too expensive.60 
Although these surveys told a story, they did not tell the full story. The 
surveys were based on lawyers’ perceptions, not on real data, while the FJC 
based its study on actual cases. The FJC solicited information from more than 
two thousand attorneys of record about the litigation costs in federal civil cases 
that were terminated in the last quarter of 2008.61 The FJC included cases that 
lasted more than four years and also every tried case to “insure the inclusion of 
cases likely to encounter the range of litigation issues.”62 In cases in which one 
or more types of discovery were reported, the median litigation costs (including 
attorneys’ fees) were $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants.63 The 
reported costs for plaintiffs ranged between $1,600 at the tenth percentile and 
$280,000 at the ninety-fifth percentile; defendant costs ranged from $5,000 to 
$300,000 at the same percentiles.64 Additionally, respondents were asked to re-
port the ratio of discovery costs to the total costs of litigation for the closed 
cases. The median percentage was 20 percent for plaintiffs’ attorneys and 27 
percent for defendants’ attorneys.65 At the ninety-fifth percentile, the reported 
percentage of litigation costs incurred in discovery was 80 percent for plaintiff 
and defendant attorneys.66 As noted by Emery Lee and Thomas Willging, au-
thors of the FJC study: 
                                                                                                                                
il-litigation-survey (“an astonishing 97% of respondents responded that the system is ‘too 
expensive,’ with 78% expressing strong agreement.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA SECTION OF 
LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT 2–3 (2009), available  
at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/american-bar-association-litigation-section-mem 
ber-survey-2009 (“82% agree that discovery is too expensive, but within that group only 
61% of plaintiffs’ lawyers think it so.”); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE  
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009), available  
at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID= 
4008. 
59  LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 2 (2010), available  
at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/lawyers-civil-justice-et-al-survey-litigation-costs 
-major-companies-2010. 
60  See Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: 
How Small Changes Can Make A Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495 
(2013). 
61  Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 769–70. (stating that categories of cases that did not 
generally involve discovery were excluded from the study). 
62  REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3. 
63  FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 2; Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 770. 
64  FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 2. 
65  Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 779–80. 
66  FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 38–39 tbls.6 & 7. 
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The empirical studies of discovery costs . . . indicate that in the typical 
case—and perhaps even in the typical major case, although that data is very lim-
ited—one should expect discovery costs to account for more than 20 percent, on 
the lower end, and maybe, on the higher end, about half of the total litigation 
costs. . . . 20 to 50 percent is what we would expect in a typical case.67 
Survey respondents were also asked to define a normative ratio of discovery 
costs to total litigation costs.68 Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ median response was 33 
percent and defense attorneys’ median response was 40 percent.69 A compari-
son of the closed case ratios to these normative ratios showed that discovery 
costs were not excessive as the median cost ratio in the closed cases was less 
than the median normative ratio.70 Attorney views on proportionality were also 
evaluated. Participants were asked to rate from one to seven how proportional 
the discovery in the case was to the client’s stakes.71 A rating of seven was des-
ignated as being too excessive, four was just right, and one was too little.72 
More than half of both plaintiff and defendant attorneys gave values of four.73 
Approximately 27 percent of attorneys gave values of five, six, or seven, 15 
percent of attorneys surveyed responded with values of six or seven, and only 
approximately 6 percent responded with seven.74 Thus, attorneys viewed dis-
covery as highly disproportionate in only about 6–15 percent of cases.75 
In its letter to the Chief Justice following the conference, the Advisory 
Committee agreed that “the cases raising concerns are a relatively small per-
centage of those filed in the federal courts.”76 However, the Committee drew 
attention to the costs of the top 5 percent of cases and noted that the cases fall-
ing into this top percentile “tend to be the ones that are more complicated and 
difficult, in which the stakes for the parties, financial or otherwise, are large.”77 
It emphasized that “[i]t would be a mistake to equate the relatively small per-
centage of such cases with a lack of importance.”78 
                                                        
67  Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 781. 
68  FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 40. 
69  Id. 
70  Id.; Reda, supra note 2, at 1106. These values were consistent with three decades of pre-
viously conducted empirical research. See Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 780 (describing 
1960s Columbia project study, 1970s Civil Litigation Research Project, and 1990s RAND 
Corporation study showing discovery expense ratios between 20 and 50 percent). 
71  FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 28 fig.14. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. (58.8 percent and 56.8 percent respectively). 
74  Id.; see also Alexander Dimitrief et al., Update on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, 
7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 211, 217 (2010). 
75  FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 28 fig.14. 
76  REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3. 
77  Id. (“In the top 5% of this sample, however, the reported costs were much higher [than the 
median values]. The most expensive cases were those in which both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant requested discovery of electronic information; the 95th percentile was $850,000 for 
plaintiffs and $991,900 for defendants.”). 
78  Id. 
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In the wake of the Duke Conference, subcommittees were formed. One 
subcommittee was formed under the direction of Judge Koeltl to “carry through 
the impetus for further work developed at the Duke Conference.”79 Three main 
goals that derived from the Duke Conference became the focus of the subcom-
mittee: “[p]roportionality in discovery, cooperation among lawyers, and early 
and active judicial case management.”80 Over the next three years, the sub-
committee began the process of crafting rules to meet these goals. It solicited 
additional studies from the FJC and held a mini-conference in October 2012 to 
obtain additional comments from select members of the legal community.81 
The standing committee ultimately made a number of rule amendments availa-
ble for public comment. 
This article focuses on the main “proportionality” amendment, which is the 
proposed change to rule 26(b)(1). The Rule currently reads: 
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant 
to any party’s claim or defense—including the existence, description, nature, 
custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and 
the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For 
good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the 
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 
26(b)(2)(C).82 
Several changes are proposed. The major change is the movement of a version 
of the proportionality requirement of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to 26(b)(1). The new 
26(b)(1) would read: 
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant 
to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, consid-
ering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controver-
sy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the 
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information 
within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discov-
erable.83 
                                                        
79  Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civ-
il Procedure, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 13 (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/14733/. 
80  May 2013 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 4.  
81  Agenda, Civil Rules Advisory Committee 77 (Apr. 11–12, 2013) [hereinafter Advisory 
Committee Agenda (April 2013)], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15484/. 
82  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
83  Agenda, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 80 (May 29–30, 2014)  
[hereinafter Standing Committee Agenda (May 2014)], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15343/. This version is different from the previous version of 
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II. ATYPICAL CASES MAKE BAD RULES 
A. The Atypical Framework 
“Atypical” or “oddball” fact patterns have arisen in some recent high-
profile and controversial Supreme Court cases.84 In a previous article, one of us 
identified such cases and four characteristics common to atypical cases: (1) 
atypical facts, (2) a change in the law, (3) the atypical facts motivate the change 
in the law, and (4) the legal change affects typical cases.85 The article argued 
that when cases meet these characteristics, judges should exercise judicial re-
straint and avoid making legal change for a variety of reasons.86 This frame-
work can be applied outside of the context of Supreme Court jurisprudence to 
the proposed rule changes. Here, we apply this framework to the change to 
Rule 26(b)(1) to determine whether restraint should have been exercised. 
B. Change in the Rules 
The rulemakers contend that no real change to the rules will occur by mov-
ing a version of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to Rule 26(b)(1). They stated “[t]he pro-
portionality factors to be added to Rule 26(b)(1) are not new.”87 However, if in 
effect the proposed rule involved no significant change, it is unlikely that there 
would be significant objections. Instead, as already stated, many in the plain-
tiffs’ and defendants’ bars are divided. Moreover, though difficult to articulate, 
the proposed rule significantly changes the rules. Currently under Rule 
26(b)(2)(C)(iii), upon motion or on its own, a court can determine whether “the 
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit” using 
a number of factors including the needs of the case. This rule comes into play 
when a party comes to the court requesting relief from searching or production. 
The court then focuses on the burden/expense/benefit of discovery in its deci-
sion whether to order such relief. The proposed rule changes the focus to the 
determination of the needs of the case from the burden/expense/benefit of dis-
covery, although the significance of this change is unclear. Under the proposed 
rule, the most important change is that a party would be affirmatively encour-
                                                                                                                                
the proposed rule that was subject to public commentary. Changes were made as a result of 
public comments and committee review. See id. 
84  See Thomas, supra note 11 (discussing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007), among other cases). 
85  See id.; Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (2011); see also Richard A. Bales & Mark B. Gerano, Oddball Ar-
bitration, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 405 (2013) (using Thomas framework in arbitra-
tion). 
86  Thomas, supra note 11, at 1017–24. 
87  Standing Committee Agenda (May 2014), supra note 83, at 67; see Tera E. Brostoff & 
Jeffrey D. Koelemay, E-Discovery Rule Gets Late-Night Rewrite, Advisory Committee Ap-
proves Rule Package, 82 U.S.L.W. 1549 (Apr. 15, 2014) (at meeting in Portland adopting 
proposed rules, Judge Koeltl explained history of proportionality in rules). 
1152 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1141 
aged to determine what it thinks is proportional to the needs of the case and 
then not disclose or search for documents that go beyond that determination. 
The party who has requested the search or production must seek an order from 
the court. In this discovery process, parties are likely to disagree on what is 
proportional to the needs of the case. 
C. Atypical Cases Motivate the Change to Rule 26(b)(1) 
With median litigation costs of only $15,000 and $20,000 for plaintiffs and 
defendants, discovery costs for plaintiffs and defendants as only 20 percent and 
27 percent of the total litigation costs, and the widespread belief that costs were 
proportional to the stakes in the closed case study, the empirical evidence col-
lected by the FJC indicates that the typical case is not in need of reform.88 That 
study’s authors had suggested a cautious reform approach (in 2010), noting the 
best course of action may be to avoid “sweeping, radical reforms of pretrial 
discovery rules” and instead to “pursue more-focused reforms” of particular 
federal rules.89 
From its initial report on the Duke Conference to the present day, the Advi-
sory Committee has repeatedly acknowledged that typical cases work well un-
der the current rules. In its report in 2010 to the Chief Justice on the Duke Con-
ference, the Committee described the results of the FJC study: 
The results closely parallel the findings of the 1997 closed-case survey the 
FJC did for the Advisory Committee . . . . Both FJC studies showed that in many 
cases filed in the federal courts, the lawyers handling the cases viewed the dis-
covery as reasonably proportional to the needs of the cases and the Civil Rules 
as working well. The FJC studies support the conclusion that the cases raising 
concerns are a relatively small percentage of those filed in the federal courts 
. . . .90 
In describing the typical case, the Committee noted that “[e]mpirical studies 
conducted over the course of more than forty years have shown that the discov-
ery rules work well in most cases.”91 The Advisory Committee report in April 
2013 also acknowledges that discovery is working fine for most cases. 
In most cases discovery now, as it was then [at the time of the 1983 Rule 26 
amendments], is accomplished in reasonable proportion to the realistic needs of 
the case. This conclusion has been established by repeated empirical studies, in-
cluding the large-scale closed-case study done by the Federal Judicial Center for 
the Duke Conference.92 
                                                        
88  See supra notes 61–75 and accompanying text. 
89  Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 787. 
90  REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3. 
91  Id. at 7. 
92  Advisory Committee Agenda (April 2013), supra note 81, at 83. This language was delet-
ed prior to official publication of the proposed rules. The committee explained its deletion:  
Is there any need for this defense, which seems directed more at anticipated academic reactions 
than anything else? “The more you say, the more you invite.” These sentences were described as 
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Similar to the Advisory Committee that proposed the 2000 discovery 
amendments, the current Advisory Committee has recommended a broad 
change despite the recognition that discovery works in typical cases. Emphasiz-
ing the importance of atypical cases, it stated that “discovery runs out of pro-
portion in a worrisome number of cases, particularly those that are complex, 
involve high stakes, and generate particularly contentious adversary behav-
ior.”93 Justifications for the proposed rules rely heavily on attorney belief de-
rived from the conference generally and impressionistic studies that costs are 
too high in some cases despite attorney belief derived from the FJC study that 
costs in typical cases are proportional. The 2010 Report to the Standing Com-
mittee stated: 
Had there been any doubt about perceptions of cost and delay, the 2010 
Conference participants and papers dispelled it. To be sure, the Federal Judicial 
Center closed-case study showed that most lawyers, in most cases, believe that 
the cost of civil litigation in the federal courts is fairly proportioned to their cas-
es. But particularly for cases involving high stakes, multiple parties, and over-
zealous advocates, there is widespread agreement that litigation is too often too 
costly.94 
Moreover, the final May 2014 Advisory Committee Report to the Standing 
Committee similarly stated: 
A principal conclusion of the Duke conference was that discovery in civil 
litigation would more often achieve the goal of Rule 1—the just, speedy, and in-
expensive determination of every action—through an increased emphasis on 
proportionality. This conclusion was expressed often by speakers and panels at 
the conference and was supported by a number of surveys done in preparation 
for the conference. . . . 
. . . . 
Although the FJC study found that a majority of lawyers thought that the 
discovery in a specific case they handled generated the “right amount” of infor-
mation, and more than half reported that the costs of discovery were the “right 
amount” in proportion to their client’s stakes in the closed cases, a quarter of at-
torneys viewed discovery costs in their cases as too high relative to their clients’ 
stakes in the case. . . . 
Other surveys prepared for the Duke conference showed even greater dis-
satisfaction with the costs and extent of civil discovery.95 
                                                                                                                                
an editorial, or as vigorous advocacy, more than something appropriate for the Note. The Sub-
committee agreed to delete them. 
Id. at 112. 
93  Id. at 83. 
94  Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civ-
il Procedure, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure 7 (May 17, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/14694/; see also 
Grimm & Yellin, supra note 60; Koeltl, supra note 55. The Grimm & Yellin paper draws 
extensively on the impressionistic surveys presented at the conference. Neither the 2008 FJC 
report, nor any of the previously conducted empirical data refuting the high cost myth are 
mentioned in the paper. Grimm & Yellin, supra note 60. 
95  Standing Committee Agenda (May 2014), supra note 83, at 65–66. 
1154 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:1141 
In the past, some have pointed out the possible influence on rulemaking 
from those representing corporations in complex cases. After the 2000 
Amendment of Rule 26(b)(1), Professor Stempel discussed particular influ-
ences. He stated: “the empirical data available to the Rulemakers neither sug-
gests nor supports Proposed Amended Rule 26(b)(1). The Advisory Committee 
appears to have determined to fight an unnecessary battle largely because of the 
political preferences of the leadership of the American College of Trial Law-
yers and the ABA Litigation Section.”96 Professor Stempel’s analysis of the 
Committee makeup indicated that the Committee consisted primarily of mem-
bers with certain characteristics, including complex litigation experience.97 He 
concluded that “the Advisory Committee vote on scope of discovery, despite a 
debate of considerable sophistication, in the end resembled Capitol Hill as 
much as a judicial deliberation.”98 
In the case of the proposed Rule 26(b)(1) amendments, similar influence 
can be seen from the earliest stages of the reform process. Consider the previ-
ously discussed 2008 ACTL-IAALS survey cited by the Committee, Judge Ko-
eltl, and Judge Grimm as one of the motivators for the current rule reform.99 
Membership in ACTL is “extended by invitation only, after careful investiga-
tion, to those experienced trial lawyers who have mastered the art of advoca-
cy.”100 Lawyers must have a minimum fifteen years’ experience to be eligible 
to join the college, and membership cannot exceed one percent of the total law-
yer population in a state or province.101 The survey respondents from ACTL 
had practiced law for an average of thirty-eight years, approximately three-
fourths of the respondents primarily represented defendants,102 and “[a]bout 40 
percent of the respondents litigate[d] complex commercial disputes.”103 
Additionally, when evaluating proposed rules, committee members likely 
draw on their own experience with the litigation system. Confirmation bias—
increased receptiveness to evidence that confirms what one already believes—
affects every player in the rulemaking process and may, in part, explain why so 
                                                        
96  Stempel, supra note 10, at 580–81; see also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Feder-
al Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 
1588 (2015) (“In explaining the change in the Committee’s position, Judge Niemeyer in-
voked persistent pressure for litigation retrenchment from elite elements of the bar and a re-
port from President Bush’s Council on Competitiveness issued back in 1991.”). 
97  Stempel, supra note 10, at 614–23; cf. A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A 
Report From the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 
679, 696 (1995); Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1655, 1666 (1995). 
98  Stempel, supra note 10, at 618. 
99  Koeltl, supra note 55. As previously noted, the ACTL has lobbied the Committee to nar-
row the scope of discovery for many years. See Stempel, supra note 10, at 557. 
100  ACTL & IAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 54. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. at 2. 
103  Id. 
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many rulemakers and attorneys believe that litigation costs are out of control 
despite empirical evidence to the contrary.104 The current Advisory Committee 
includes many individuals who, similar to the members of ACTL, have com-
plex litigation experience. All four practitioners (Elizabeth Cabraser, Peter 
Keisler, Parker Folse III, and John Barkett), as well as the academic (Dean 
Klonoff), list extensive complex litigation experience on their respective profile 
pages.105 Moreover, many of the federal judges have similar past experienc-
es.106 For many on the Committee, the “typical” litigation experience appears to 
be the atypical case. Additionally, research shows the limited ability of humans 
to consider all the facts, circumstances, and implications of a problem. Instead, 
they inordinately focus on what is before them.107 So, the rulemakers may be 
able to see only the problem presented to them—that is, high costs and delays 
in discovery, thus motivating the rule change. 
                                                        
104  Reda, supra note 2, at 1119. 
105  John M. Barkett, SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P., http://www.shb.com/professionals 
/b/barkett-john (last visited June 22, 2015) (“Mr. Barkett has, over the years, been a com-
mercial litigator (contract and corporate disputes, employment, trademark and antitrust), en-
vironmental litigator (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and toxic tort), and, for the past several years, 
a peacemaker and problem solver, serving as an arbitrator, mediator, facilitator, or allocator 
in a variety of environmental, commercial, or reinsurance contexts.”); Elizabeth J. Cabraser, 
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, http://www.lieffcabraser.com/Attorneys/Elizabeth 
-J-Cabraser.shtml (last visited June 22, 2015)(“ Possessing unparalleled expertise in complex 
civil litigation, Elizabeth has served as court-appointed lead, co-lead, or class counsel in 
scores of federal multi-district and state coordinated proceedings.”); Parker C. Folse, 
SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P., http://www.susmangodfrey.com/Attorneys/Parker-C-Folse/ (last 
visited June 22, 2015)(“He represents both plaintiffs and defendants in a wide variety of 
complex commercial litigation matters, including contract disputes, antitrust litigation, patent 
infringement cases, and audit malpractice suits. Mr. Folse has been a fellow of the American 
College of Trial Lawyers since 2012 and has extensive  experience in difficult, complex 
commercial cases.”); Peter D. Keisler, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, http://www.sidley.com/en 
/people/peter-keisler, (last visited June 22, 2015)(“[Keisler] has successfully represented 
some of the country’s largest companies in the telecommunications, transportation, energy 
and healthcare industries, as well as a host of national trade associations . . . . His practice 
representing clients before the United States Supreme Court, federal courts of appeals and 
federal district courts has included the leading role in the nation’s most important energy 
lawsuits of the past several years . . . .”); Law Faculty: Robert Klonoff, LEWIS &  
CLARK L. SCH., http://law.lclark.edu/live/profiles/310-robert-klonoff/ (last visited June 22, 
2015)(“[Professor Klonoff’s] areas of expertise include class action litigation, civil proce-
dure, and appellate litigation. . . . At Jones Day, Professor Klonoff handled complex litiga-
tion at both the trial and appellate levels and also held the administrative post of chair of the 
pro bono program for all of the firm’s 20+ offices.”). 
106  Duke Subcommittee chair John Koeltl worked at Debevoise & Plimpton for  
nearly twenty years. Biography for Hon. John G. Koeltl, AM. B.  
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials 
/2015-sac/koeltl_john.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited June 22, 2015). Duke Subcommittee 
member Paul Grimm was a lawyer with Jordan Coyne Savits & Lopata and Niles, Barton & 
Wilmer for several years. 138 CONG. REC. S7334 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 2012) (statement of Sen. 
Chuck Grassley). 
107  See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2012). 
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D. The Change in the Rule Will Affect Typical Cases 
So, we have showed a change in the rules and that the change in the rules is 
motivated by atypical cases. The final characteristic of the atypical framework 
is that the proposed rules will affect typical cases. Although only atypical cases 
motivate the proposed proportionality amendments, the amendments also apply 
to typical cases. The result may be an increase in cost and delay in typical, al-
ready proportional cases. Under the new rule, a party can choose not to search 
or produce documents that they deem not “proportional to the needs of the 
case.”108 If the party does not search and/or produce such documents, the re-
questing party may move to compel the documents, which will result in more 
costs to the parties in motion practice as well as costs to the court in managing 
discovery, in addition to more delay.109 Also, plaintiffs in certain typical cas-
es—for example, employment discrimination cases—may be affected more 
than others. If discovery is not searched and/or produced in such cases in which 
summary judgment motions often are made, plaintiffs may have even more dif-
ficulty defeating summary judgment motions with less discovery. Consequent-
ly, certain laws like the employment discrimination laws may enjoy less en-
forcement. 
E. The Cost of Proposed Rule 26(b)(1) 
Under the atypical framework, change should not be made when atypical 
cases motivate legal change that affects typical cases because of the cost of 
such change. One cost of atypical rule amendments is a loss of legitimacy for 
rulemakers and the rulemaking process.110 Rulemakers can lose legitimacy 
when they appear to reject empirical evidence or appear to follow the wishes of 
special interest groups.111 At the same time, certain classes of litigants may be 
placed at a disadvantage under the new rules, creating perceived unfairness in 
the litigation system.112 
A second cost of atypical rule amendments also arises from the application 
of the amendment to typical cases.113 Judges may have difficulty understanding 
how to apply the new rule to typical cases given these cases do not drive the 
rule amendment.114 This in turn leads to disjointed case law and inconsistent 
precedent, increasing costs throughout the judicial system.115 
                                                        
108  Standing Committee Agenda (May 2014), supra note 83. 
109  See, e.g., National Employment Lawyers Association, Comments on Proposed Changes 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Under Consideration by the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules (Mar. 1, 2013) (on file with authors). 
110  See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1020. 
111  See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 47–48. 
112  Tobias, supra note 44. 
113  See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1021. 
114  Id. 
115  See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 44. 
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Learning costs for legal professionals occur with any rule change but when 
atypical cases motivate reform, lawyers and judges with more typical experi-
ence may face higher learning costs for the new rules.116 In this respect, atypi-
cal rule amendments create high public transition costs as many legal profes-
sionals have typical experience and will lack familiarity with the reasons 
behind the new rules.117 
Interparty costs are also possible here.118 As already mentioned, the rule 
very well will motivate withholding or not searching in situations where such 
behavior did not occur previously.119 
A final cost is that once atypical rule amendments are passed, they are un-
likely to be revised.120 Certain features of the rulemaking process create this 
inertia. First, numerous commentators have argued that rule changes should be 
made only reluctantly, when there is a substantial need for the change.121 The 
Advisory Committee has pursued this approach, which is characterized by con-
stantly monitoring the rules for areas in need of revision but only reluctantly 
making changes.122 Even if an advisory committee is willing to reconsider a re-
cently adopted rule amendment, the slow pace of the rulemaking system means 
several years may pass before any amendment is revised through the committee 
process.123 
III. FUTURE RULEMAKING 
To prevent atypical rule changes in the future, changes are necessary in a 
few areas including committee membership and the rules’ focus. First, the cur-
rent Advisory Committee is largely dominated by individuals with complex lit-
igation experience.124 Extending Committee membership to include lawyers 
with smaller practices and different practice areas will help shift the perspective 
of the Committee away from the smaller subset of issues unique to complex 
cases and will provide the Committee more perspectives of the litigation sys-
tem.125 Perhaps Congress and not the Chief Justice should control who sits on 
the Advisory Committee. Second, the rulemakers should avoid one-size-fits-all 
rule amendments that will affect typical cases when the problem that they seek 
                                                        
116  See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1021. 
117  See id. 
118  See id. at 1022. 
119  See id. 
120  See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
121  See, e.g., John P. Frank, the Rules of Civil Procedure—Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1883, 1885 (1989) (“The fundamental precept of rulemaking always ought be that no 
rule shall be altered unless there is substantial need for the change.”); McCabe, supra note 
97, at 1679. 
122  McCabe, supra note 97, at 1679. 
123  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
124  See supra Part II.C. 
125  Coleman, supra note 7, at 295. 
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to address does not lie with typical cases. Since its inception, the Advisory 
Committee has assumed that the REA’s reference to “general rules” requires 
transsubstantive rulemaking.126 Professor Stephen Subrin has championed 
avoiding such transsubstantive rulemaking to address issues unique to limited 
sets of cases.127 While transsubstantive rulemaking has a number of important 
advantages,128 Professor Subrin and others have noted that it is sometimes a 
poor fit for large and complex cases, resulting in unnecessary cost, delay, and 
complexity in the legal system.129 To ensure that the same rules are applied to 
all cases, rulemakers are forced to draft general rules in response to problems in 
specific, usually complex cases.130 Consistent with these ideas that transsub-
stantive rulemaking should be on its last legs, in his testimony before the Advi-
sory Committee against proposed discovery changes, Professor Arthur Miller 
emphasized that the rulemakers should consider special rules for the problemat-
ic, complex cases.131 
                                                        
126  See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 535, 543 (“transsubstantivity has remained a foundational assumption for all subse-
quent advisory committees.”). 
127  Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjust-
ing the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377 (2010) [hereinafter Subrin, 
Limitations]. In the Limitations article, Professor Subrin defines transsubstantivity as “the 
notion that the same procedural rules should be available for all civil law suits: (1) regardless 
of the substantive law underlying the claims, or ‘case-type’ transsubstantivity; and (2) re-
gardless of the size of the litigation or the stakes involved, or ‘case-size’ transsubstantivity.” 
Id., at 378; see Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the 
Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 41 (1994); Stephen N. 
Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging 
Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2038–43 (1989). Other scholars have also 
championed this cause. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for 
Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 333 (2008); Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and 
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
693, 713 n.140 (1988); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a 
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975). 
128  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Asser-
tions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-substantive 
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244 (1989); 
Subrin, Limitations, supra note 127, at 387. 
129  Subrin, Limitations, supra note 127, at 388–91. 
130  Stephen B. Burbank, The Roles of Litigation, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 705, 711 (2002) (“The 
misguided approach to procedural reform that treats all litigation as if it were complex litiga-
tion can at least be explained, if not justified, by the quest for uniform and transsubstantive 
regulation that has preoccupied modern American procedural policy.”); Subrin, Limitations, 
supra note 127, at 388–91. These rules are often drafted to give a great deal of discretion to 
judges and lawyers to accommodate the large range of potential cases that they may trigger. 
Id. Discretion creates greater precedential uncertainty as different judges are empowered by 
the rules to treat similar cases differently, increasing the monetary and justice costs of the 
litigation system as a whole. Id. 
131  Transcript of Testimony of Arthur Miller Before Advisory Committee (Jan. 9, 2014), 
36–45, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/9446/. 
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CONCLUSION 
This article suggests that rulemakers should avoid rule amendments that 
are motivated by atypical cases and will affect typical cases. When atypical rule 
amendments are passed, high systemic costs arise. The proposed proportionali-
ty amendment provides a useful example of how atypical cases can motivate 
reform efforts and how atypical rule amendments may negatively affect typical 
cases. Future changes such as broadening committee membership and a will-
ingness to adopt non-transsubstantive rules can eliminate the problem of such 
atypical rules. 
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